Simon Cook previously described the novel account of the human mind which emerged before the First World War- the Cambridge … Continue reading Herbert Spencer on Instinct and Intelligence: The Background of the “Cambridge Mind”
In my last post I explained Rivers’ ‘conversion’ from evolutionary to diffusionist models of social change. Before returning to psychology … Continue reading Peace & War: theories of the warrior class
A familiar trope in both American and European anthropology at the turn of the twentieth century was the discussion of the ‘extinction’ of the savage tribes. It was taken as a kind of gospel that while civilized races in the modern world would increase, “savage” and “primitive” races would diminish and decline over time. Of course, there were those who believed that modernity was not beneficial to modern man, but even though who considered modern conditions to be degenerate, also underscored that “savage” tribes were quickly declining. For the emerging social sciences, the true problem in the early years of the 20th century was not the existence of the decline, but its causes.
In the early 20th century, the decline of savage peoples was bound in theories of population generally, which, as with most turn of the century anthropology, has not invited critical commentary. Everyone had a theory concerning the decline of “savages” “primitives” or “natives.” Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), to take one example, was a German geographer. He is known today if at all for influencing the Nazi expansionist ideology of lebensraum. Ratzel underscored that civilization advanced and progressed as population increased, as societies neared each other, they would benefit from the commerce of ideas, the commerce of commerce and increased competition. This means that somewhat paradoxically, Ratzel was both a proponent of modernization and an advocate “free space” for ethnic development. As societies grew in complexity and refinement, those societies would too have their populations increase. As importantly, Ratzel addressed the nearly ancient problem of the interconnection between luxury, commerce and the vitality and nations. Unlike a number of early modern and enlightenment theorists, Raztel underscored that the advancement of society away from a kind of agrarian, marital virtue and social structure, would not be the death of that society, but the reason for its flourishing.
If, in the minds of many anthropologists, modern societies could benefit from the increase in population, modernity was however not treating “savages” well. As Ratzel explained (in a translated excerpt in the Source Book for Social Origins, an early and important compendium of anthropological texts for students), savage peoples “offer examples of shrinkage and retrogression” (pg. 46.) These populations were the victims of famine and warfare. Ratzel continued that the thinness of the population itself was the reason behind its decline: “their smaller numbers are more readily brought to the point of dwindling or vanishing,” with each individual in these small communities rapidly depleting his energies. An individual at a “lower stage of civilization” did not have the advantages of a diversified economy; he was frugal and often visited by dearth. Thus, it was no accident that primitive peoples were disappearing. It was not simply contact with “superior races” which lead to the extinction of barbarous peoples. More specifically, Ratzel detailed, it was a combination of warfare and self-destruction. The two were often connected: warfare, murder and kidnappings lead to imbalances between the sexes, with individuals in the state of nature not having any of the benefits of modern sanitation, leading to a constant diminution of their numbers (pg. 46-7.)
This discussion achieved a new urgency with the disappearance and the diminution of the populations of primitive peoples in the south Pacific and elsewhere. William Fremont Blackman (who became an American university president) bemoaned that among the indigenous Hawaiians the laws of Malthusian population did not hold. Even with a plentiful food supply, the numbers of indigenous still decreased (The Making of Hawaii: A Study in Social Evolution) due to war and infanticide, cannibalism and human sacrifice (210-11.) Important too were the birth and death rates, with the birth rate low and the death rate high among the Hawaiians, with many indigenous having few or now children (212.)
Alexander Carr-Saunders (1886 to 1966) has been the topic of numerous posts at EWP. He was Director of the London School of Economics from 1937 to 1956, initially reading zoology. Carr-Saunders studied bio-metrics under Karl Pearson, was involved in the Eugenics Education Society as its Secretary, and in 1922 published, The Population Problem (PP). PP is among the most dense of texts and does not make for easy reading, particularly for contemporary readers. Nor does it really engender feelings of worthiness among historians of the 20th century social and behavioral sciences as it is (among other things) an account of the social evolution of primitive and civil peoples (or as Simon has pointed out in many other contexts- Carr-Saunders narrates in a text on quantity and quality the historical transition from races and peoples to nations, blending many, many approaches and disciplinary tools.
In this essay, I will do some work, continued in parts II and III, to illustrate the importance of the “Cambridge Mind” to Carr-Saunders’ landmark Population Problem, a work still viewed by historians and social scientists as foundational to the development of modern demographic science and population research. In Part I, I will spend some time detailing first, how to re-conceptualize the PP as a textual product of a number of overlapping narratives and second, how PP’s arguments about the psychology and physiology of reproduction are best understood as an outgrowth of the “Cambridge Mind.”
Many theories, and their abridgements, seek to describe the character and identity of the Cambridge Mind. The engagement is essentially contested, meaning that the alternatives are so dependent upon such diverse, but committed foundational beliefs, narratives and values, that agreement is impossible.
Yet the endeavour is of great importance when we consider the goal, an answer to why Cambridge University since 1830, has produced many of the greatest thinkers, theories and inventions of the modern world.
My contribution here is that Cambridge intellectuals between 1830 and 1880, produced and reproduced radical hypothesis with dramatic effects: that the universe was knowable, that nothing within the human cognitive framework excluded complete rational knowledge, and that religions should not be allowed to govern, nor censor, research exploration.
My own list of factors, which have engaged my published work, include two essential ingredients: that intellectuals are fashioned, and leaders reproduced, within vigorous ‘knowledge networks’, and that a knowledge is ‘organized’ in structures, institutions and practices to reproduce the achieved knowledge.
Wallas understood the Great Society as the form of social organization brought about in large part by what economists then … Continue reading Graham Wallas on Dispositions, the Great Society, the Failures of Experimental Psychology, and Some Novel Connections (Part 2)
My posts on William McDougall and Simon’s on the “Cambridge Mind” underscores the emergence of a model which sought to … Continue reading Graham Wallas on Instincts and the Study of Politics (Part 1)
In my previous post for The Grote Club, I outlined McDougall’s account of instincts and intelligence among both humans and … Continue reading William McDougall on Psychology, Intelligence, Childhood and Civilization (Part II)
W.H.R. Rivers was a key figure in the development of both psychology and anthropology in early twentieth-century Cambridge. Consequently, much of … Continue reading Meetings of People: Rivers & Diffusionism
Simon Cook and Chris Donohue have brought an audience to, and focus upon, the Grote Cub for good reason: it played a crucial role in developing the emerging social sciences in Cambridge, Britain and America in particular. Here I wish to focus on, and explore, the man who founded, grounded and expounded the Club’s ethos and practices – Professor John Grote (1813-1866). In future blog posts we will explore several crucial elements of his life and corpus: the family and networks that grounded him; the unique methods he learned from the Cambridge Network; the intense analysis of his experience of Being in the term ‘personalism’ he coined; the recognition that as thinking was conducted in language, that conversation was core to knowing the world; a brilliant critique of Mill’s dominant utilitarian thinking, and his own unique ethical and political theories. Latter we can explore some of the many Montaignian insights on human nature and conduct.
A brilliant student member of the Club, Henry Sidgwick, aged 22, wrote to a friend that John Grote retained an eclecticism, ‘certainly retained, with the freshness, indecisiveness of youth till the day of his death…’This was attractive to young scholars. In later reviews of Grote’s posthumous publications, he uses a similar vocabulary, littered with ‘friendly’, ‘eager’, ‘astute’, ‘independent’, ‘thoughtful’, ‘effective’ and ‘good sense’. He notes that John neither intended, nor achieved the foundation of a new ‘school’ of philosophy, and indeed opposed in all ways possible to the ‘odium ethicum’ or ‘warfare’ that purveyed intellectual debate in mid-nineteenth century Britain.